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The Christian Zionist Lobby and US-Israel Policy
Mark G. Grzegorzewski
ABSTRACT

This research explores the role of the Christian Zionist Lobby in shaping U.S.
policy towards Israel. It is posited that the Christian Zionist Lobby, due to their
eschatological goals, diverge from the interests of the larger Israel Lobby described by
Mearsheimer and Walt. To test this hypothesis an exploratory case study is implemented
to explain why the U.S. shifted its policy from supporting the Road Map to backing Israeli
unilateralism. As the results of this study show, the Christian Zionists did actively oppose
the Road Map and may have influenced American policy making. However, it would be a
mistake to characterize the Gaza pullout as the most desirable policy alternative for the
Christian Zionist Lobby. This study concludes that when comparing the lobbying efforts
against the Road Map and Israeli unilateralism, the Christian Zionists actively opposed
the former policy while the evidence in support of the latter policy remained inconclusive.
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Map I: Israel and the Occupied Territories

Source: Nationmaster.com
1

Map II: Israeli Security Fence

Source: B’Tselem
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Figure I: Timeline of Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

October 23, 1998-In
Wye Memorandum
both sides agree to
immediately resume
permanent status
negotiations on an
accelerated basis and
to reach agreement by
May 4, 1999

September 13, 1993-a
joint Israeli-Palestinian
Declaration of
Principles (DOP) is
signed, based on the
agreement worked out
in Oslo.

1991- Madrid
ConferencePalestinians negotiate
with Israel as part of
Jordanian delegation.

1992- two Israeli
professors in Oslo are
approached by
Palestinians who say
Arafat is ready for
peace. Negotiations
last for two years.

May 5, 1996negotiations on the
permanent status
arrangements
commence in Taba.

2002-Arab Peace
Initiative , calls for
Israeli withdrawal from
all territories occupied
since 1967 and return
of the Palestine
refugees to Israel in
return for recognition
of Israel and normal
relations.

July 2000- Camp David
Summit ends without
an agreement being
reached. At its
conclusion, a Trilateral
Statement was issued
defining the agreed
principles to guide
future negotiations

September 2000SecondIntifda begins
due to Palestinians
viewing Israel as
dragging their feet in
peace process and
Sharon's visit to Al
Aqsa Mosque

2004-Israel's cabinet
and Knesset approve
the plan for
disengagement from
the Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip and
northern Samaria.

2003-the "Road Map"
for a solution to the
Israel-Palestinian
conflict is presented to
Israel and the
Palestinians
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2008- At the Annapolis
Conference Israelis and
Palestinians agree to
engage in continuous
negotiations in an effort
to conclude an
agreement before the
end of 2008.

2006-In the elections of
the Palestinian Authority
a Hamas-led government
is established

2007-In the Palestinian
civil war, Hamas takes
over the Gaza Strip.

June 4, 2009- In Cairo
speech President Obama
remarks that both sides
should live up to their
responsibilities that were
agreed to under the Road
Map.
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INTRODUCTION
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy claim the Israel Lobby has caused the U.S. to pursue policies that are not in line
with American national interests 1. According to the authors, these policies diverge from
America’s true national interest and have consequently hurt American power. Yet
Mearsheimer and Walt do not claim these outcomes occurred because the lobby sought
to further Israeli interests at the expense of American interests. Nor do the authors claim
that the Israel Lobby is a monolithic bloc that all Jewish groups support. To the authors,
the Israel Lobby exists like any other special interest group in the United States, in that it
uses the normal channels of government to further its own preferences.
This desire to further both Israeli and American interests results from members of
the Israel Lobby not viewing their ethnic and national identities as exclusionary. These
non-exclusionary identities allow for members of the Israel Lobby to hold attachments to
both Israel and America. In accordance with certain American nationals supporting
Israel, Mearsheimer and Walt label those who actively lobby on behalf of Israel as
belonging to the Israel Lobby. However, by identifying the Israel Lobby as groups who
support a secure Israel as a territorially bound state, as well as those who support the
Jewish state for eschatological purposes, the authors understate the efforts and
intentions of the Christian Zionist Lobby. As a result, this research will contribute to the
influences on U.S.-Israel policy by presenting how the interests of the Israel Lobby are

1
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not homogeneous. Accordingly, different actors within the Israel Lobby seek to shape
American-Israeli policy based upon different preferences.

6

CHAPTER I
RESEARCH OUTLINE
This research project sought to answer why America has provided nearly unconditional
support for Israel? I hypothesized that the Christian Zionist Lobby influences the
American government to pursue policies in support of Israel. To test the hypothesis two
case studies were conducted to analyze the Christian Zionists influence over the policy
shift from American support of the Road Map to the U.S. backing Israeli unilateralism.
The first case study centered on the organizational structure of the Christian Zionists in
order to understand the ways in which they influence the American government to
support Israel. The second case study focused on a specific time period in which the
U.S. supported a shift in policy from the Road Map to Israeli Unilateralism.

Research Question
In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy it is claimed that the Israel Lobby causes
America to provide Israel with nearly unconditional support. This researcher instead
posits that the Christian Zionists pursue their own preferences in Washington, and in
doing so influence American policy towards Israel. As the literature review shows, the
Christian Zionist Lobby works to pursue policy preferences that are detached from the
rest of the Israel Lobby. These preferences are based upon eschatological beliefs, while
the Israel Lobby preferences are based upon securing a territorially based Jewish state.
7

Accordingly, when the objectives of the Christian Zionists are detached from the Israel
Lobby, the shaping of American policy toward Israel can be understood through a much
richer analysis.

Theoretical Framework
There are several International Relations theories that could be used to explain
American support for a stronger Israel. In Mearsheimer and Walt’s work they view the
Israel Lobby as a domestic group that attempts to shape the U.S. interests. As the
authors are Realists, this runs counter to their understanding of how states are to
formulate their interests. Realists see states as always defining their interests through
self-preservation, due to the anarchical nature of the international system. Their strive for
self-preservation leads states to clash due to each viewing the other’s power relative to
its own. Put another way, states see power in the international system as a zero-sum
game in which one unit of power lost by a state is a one unit gain in power by another
state. This view of power causes states to avoid alliances in their policy formation. For
states view other states’ intentions with distrust. This is not to say that states never form
alliances, but when they do, it is for the purpose of enhancing their own power.
This researcher holds the same view as Mearsheimer and Walt, in that the
anarchical structure of the system causes states to define their interests in selfinterested terms. I also concur with the normative claim that domestic groups should not
define a state’s interest. For in redefining a state’s interest outside of self-preservation
states may undertake policies such as democracy promotion that will increase the power
of other states. This action which is not in accordance with self-interest will cause the
state to use valuable resources that could have been used to increase the power of
8

one’s own state. Further, this policy preference may cause the weaker state to drag the
stronger state down with it. To clarify, the weaker state will then cause the stronger state
to pursue policies, thereby sapping its power and making it weaker relative to other
states in the system.
The current U.S. administration follows a liberal hegemonic stability theory, as
was recently articulated in the National Security Strategy of May 2010 2. This theoretical
perspective is based upon the belief that a hegemon will have the capability to enforce
the rules of the system; the will to do so; and a commitment to the system which is
perceived as beneficial to the major states. The capability to enforce the rules of the
system depends on a large and growing economy; dominance in a leading sector, such
as technology or economics; and political power backed up by military power. To induce
other states to remain in the hegemonic system, the hegemon will pay the costs of
maintaining the system while allowing some states to free ride. The hegemon will also
promote the ideal that a prosperous international economic system with the hegemon at
the apex is the most beneficial economic system for all. A third way in which the
hegemon appeals to other states is through espousing the belief that its values are
universal and should be shared by all. Finally, the hegemon will either award states that
accept its leadership with greater integration or punish those states who challenge its
leadership through the denying of incentives. Although the hegemonic system will allow
the hegemon to dominate the international system in the short term, eventually other
states will emerge to challenge the hegemon. This challenge to the hegemon will be a
result of the very policies the hegemon championed. For instance, free riders may
eventually amass great power due to the not contributing to the burdens of ensure

2

National Security Strategy 2010: 17
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international order, while the hegemon loses power due to bearing the costs of the free
rider.
Another theory to explain American support of Israel, and the one used for this
study, is Liberalism. This theory focuses on the actors within states, such as the Jewish
Diaspora and the Christian Zionist Lobby. In particular these actors advocate policies to
strengthen American support for Israel, which has developed into a strong friendship
between Israel and the U.S. In the process of domestic groups such as the Jewish
Diaspora and the Christian Zionist Lobby advocating their preferences regarding foreign
countries such as Israel, Americans have begun to see Israel as more like “us.” As a
result of these domestic actors in Liberalism, the theory holds that it is not the
international system that determines a state’s preferences but the lobbying forces within
the state. This access to policy formation allows domestic groups to shape policy which
is in line with their autonomous preferences.

Research Methodology
In order to examine the Christian Zionist Lobby in considerable detail, the
methodological design for this research is a case study. The type of case study in this
research is explanatory, because the research is based on a “why” question. In utilizing
the explanatory case study, it allows for the independent variable to be traced over time,
so as to show how it brings about a change in the dependent variable 3. In testing this
explanatory case study, operational links were traced and analyzed through the

3
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technique known as pattern matching. This technique identifies operational links by
“compar[ing] an empirically based pattern with a predicted one” 4.
The first case study, which focuses on the organizational structure of the
Christian Zionists, utilizes the organizations identified by Mearsheimer and Walt. These
organizations include Christians United for Israel, National Christian Leadership
Conference for Israel, Unity Coalition for Israel, Christian Friends of Israeli Communities,
Christians’ Israel Public Action Committee, International Christian Embassy Jerusalem,
International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, and Stand for Israel. Data for this these
organizations was acquired from the individual Christian Zionist’ websites, as well as the
Better Business Bureau (BBB) 5, and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 6. Where applicable,
data from the organizations social networking sites was also included.
In the search for evidence, this case study attempted to draw out the casual
connections between U.S. politicians associated with Christian Zionism and the
American policy shift from the Road Map to Israeli unilateralism. These connections
were sought in order to demonstrate how the Christian Zionist Lobby directly shapes
policy through its support for particular politicians. The politicians included were those
named by the Christian Zionists groups on their website or by Mearsheimer and Walt.
These politicians were then paired with the following search terms in the Google News
Archive 7: unilateralism, unilateral disengagement, road map, disengagement plan, Gaza
expulsion plan, hitnatkut (disengagement), separation wall, security fence, and security
barrier.
4

Yin 2009: 136
This source was chosen because it tracks businesses’ records of delivering results in
accordance with BBB standards, which focus on how businesses should treat the public.
6
This source was chosen because it could confirm whether a business was correctly listed as
charity, lobby, etc.
7
This source was chosen because it provides a historical overview of relevant articles from a
number of sources.
5
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Data recording monetary contributions to U.S. politicians was sought by visiting
opensecrets.org. This website tracks financial contributions made to U.S. politicians by
lobbying groups. In this research, opensecrets.org was contacted to see if they could
provide an individual listing of pro-Israeli organizations by industry. They responded that
they could do this work, but at cost $125 per hour. Due to financial constraints, this
research was unable to include an individual listing of pro-Israeli groups by industry. Yet,
this research project was able to include opensecrets.org’s data on combined campaign
committees and leadership public action committees (PACs) by the pro-Israel industry.
Evidence for the second case study, which was the shift from the Road Map to
Israeli unilateralism, came in the form of document analysis where media materials were
collected through the Google News Archive search engine. The search terms imputed
into Google were the following: Christians United for Israel, National Christian
Leadership Conference for Israel, Unity Coalition for Israel, Christian Friends of Israeli
Communities, Christians’ Israel Public Action Committee, International Christian
Embassy Jerusalem, International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, Stand for Israel;
as well as the more generic search terms of Christian lobby, Christian Zionists, Christian
Right, and evangelical lobby. The generic search terms were included so as not to omit
any important evidence. These search terms were then individually paired with the terms
unilateralism, unilateral disengagement, road map, disengagement plan, Gaza expulsion
plan, hitnatkut, separation wall, security fence, and security barrier 8.
The search engine used was the Google News Archive, since its web crawler is
able to collect a large number of primary and secondary sources. The Google News
Archive search engine returned articles from both freely accessible websites and
8

These terms were chosen after deliberating what would be the most comprehensive ways to
identify the dependent variable.
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websites which required a fee to view their content. For the websites which required a
fee to view their content, the Access World News database was used. This database
was utilized because it was not feasible to purchase several different user licenses to
view the vast array of search results that Google News Archive returned. Instead,
through using this database, all fee based content was viewed in one place without
purchasing a license. However, it must be admitted that while the Access World News
database has archived content from over 2,000 different media sources, there was an
extremely small number of articles that it did not have archived. As a result of the very
small number of articles not found, and the fact that many of them repeated content that
I had cataloged elsewhere, I did not seek to include them as evidence in this research.
This second case study was bracketed to the dates of June 24, 2002 through
September 18, 2006. The first date indicated the day the Road Map to Peace was
presented by President Bush, while the second date was the day Prime Minister Olmert
officially abandoned the unilateral disengagement policy. However, as the authors note,
serious movement on the Road Map did not occur until March 7, 2003.
Finally, to ground the second case study to the time period under study, a
Google News archive search was conducted with the words “road map,” “U.S.,”
“America,” and “Israel.” The search results were isolated by using only The Guardian
newspaper archive. This random newspaper selection was chosen simply to narrow
down the vast quantity of web hits that the search returned.

13

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature found that the Christian Zionists do not share the same policy preferences
as the rest of the Israel Lobby. While both the neoconservatives and Jewish Diaspora
sought to maintain a secure Israel as a territorially bound state, the Christian Zionists
pursued Israeli policies to fulfill religious prophecy. Thus, as a result of this literature
review, this research developed a better explanation of American policy toward Israel by
isolating the Christian Zionists and understanding them as their own lobby.

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
The crux of this research centers on the contentions claims made by John Mearsheimer
and Stephen Walt. Accordingly, this literature review focuses on the actors the authors
identify as seeking to influence U.S. policy toward Israel, otherwise known as the Israel
Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt argue the Israel Lobby is “a powerful interest group, made
up both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel’s case within
the United States and influence American foreign policy in ways that its members
believe will benefit the Jewish state” 9. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that through
influencing American Middle Eastern policy in favor of the Jewish state, the Israel lobby

9

Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 5

14

has actually harmed U.S. and Israeli interests in the region 10. In fact, the authors believe
the Israel lobby has been more successful than any other special interest group in
managing to distort U.S. foreign policy in ways that are inimical to American national
interest 11.
To Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel lobby cannot be described as a single
monolithic entity. Instead the authors more loosely define the Israel lobby as “anyone
who works actively to preserve America’s special relationship with the Jewish
state” 12.The authors identify some of the major actors who seek to advance U.S. foreign
policy in favor of Israel, including: members of the media, scholars, Jewish Americans,
Jewish civic associations (e.g. American Israel Public Affairs Committee), pro-Israel
think thanks and PACs (e.g. Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the American
Friends of Israel PAC, respectively), neoconservatives (e.g. Richard Perle), and
Christian Zionists (e.g. Pat Robertson). While the members of these various groups all
seek a similar objective, they exercise their influence through a variety of ways.
The authors claim that Jewish Americans lobby for policies beneficial to Israel
with the mindset that their lobbying efforts will also benefit America 13. Jewish civic
associations, such as the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, are one component of the Israel lobby. This particular group is composed
of fifty-one of the largest and most important Jewish civic organizations. The stated
mission of this Jewish association is to “‘forg[e] diverse groups into a unified force for
Israel’s well being’ and working to ‘strengthen and foster the special U.S.-Israel
relationship’” 14. Another component of the Israel lobby is the Pro-Israel think tanks which

10

Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 112
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serve to “shap[e] the prevailing climate of ideas” 15. Additionally, pro-Israel PACs work to
reward or punish politicians based upon their support of Israel 16.
The neoconservatives (or “neocons”) within the Israel Lobby pursue hawkish
policies, which they believe will benefit both the U.S. and Israel 17. The neocons in the
1980’s aligned with Reagan’s tough anti-communist stance and found that their interests
converged with the “shared liberal democratic values” of Israel 18. Over time this
neoconservative network grew, with those who embrace their approach now being found
in academia, the media, government, think tanks, and various lobbies. Finally, due to
many within the neocon movement having a Jewish ethnic background and close
relations with Israel, many critics have claimed that they care more about Israel than the
U.S. 19
The authors identify as the Christian Zionists as the last prominent group within
the Israel lobby. This group found its ranks galvanized by the outcome of the 1967 Six
Day War, as they saw the Israeli victory as a sign from God. In response to this
outcome, the Christian Zionist movement began to coalesce around evangelical
concerns, among which was support for Israel. The authors note several Christian
Zionist organizations in support of Israel, including Christians United for Israel, National
Christian Leadership Conference for Israel, Unity Coalition for Israel, Christian Friends of
Israeli Communities, Christians’ Israel Public Action Committee, International Christian
Embassy Jerusalem, International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, and Stand for
Israel. Despite revealing claims that label the Christian Zionists as Israel’s “ultimate

15
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strategic asset” 20 or Netanyahu’s claim that Israel is dependent on the Christian
Zionists 21, Mearsheimer and Walt characterize the Christian Zionists as a “junior
partner” 22 and as an “adjunct” to the Israel lobby 23.
In understating the Christian Zionists in relation to the pro-Israel Jewish groups,
the authors note a survey from the 1980’s showing little evidence of direct lobbying by
the Christian Zionists on the subject of Israel 24. They also note the lack of financial
power the Christian Zionists have in relation to pro-Israel Jewish groups 25. Another
reason the authors believe the Christian Zionists to be unequal is that Christian groups
receive less media attention than the pro-Israel Jewish groups when speaking on the
matter of Middle East politics 26. Evidence of this type seems strong enough for the
authors to accept the Christian Zionists as secondary to the Jewish groups, yet
important enough to be subsumed under the broad categorization of the Israel lobby.
In the second half of their book, Mearsheimer and Walt conduct five case studies
to test their thesis. To this researcher, the case studies conducted by Mearsheimer and
Walt are the weakest part of their work. The case studies concluded in The Israel Lobby
and U.S. Foreign Policy lack the casual mechanisms to definitely show the Israel Lobby
having any affect on policy outcomes. Moreover, the Christian Zionists are largely
absent from the case studies Mearsheimer and Walt conclude.
In particular, in the chapter titled “The Lobby Versus the Palestinians,”
Mearsheimer and Walt place considerable emphasis on the Road Map to Peace and the

20
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subsequent American policy shift to support unilateralism. The authors claim that
President George W. Bush, knowing a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was
in America’s best interest, set forth the outline to the Road Map to Peace in a speech on
June 24, 2002. This speech was particularly meaningful for two reasons. First, it set out
the position stating that Yasser Arafat would have to step down as leader of the
Palestinians if peace was to move forward, and there was eventually going to be a viable
Palestinian state. The second meaningful point of the speech was that Bush urged the
parties to the conflict to create a Palestinian state by 2005. In achieving this aim, the
Israelis would have to halt all settlement activity in the occupied territories. Furthermore,
the Israelis would have to gradually rescind their control over the occupied territories as
the security situation improved.
President Bush began to actively promote the Road Map on March 14,, 2002,
which was a week after Arafat resigned as leader of the Palestinian Authority. The
Quartet, whose members included the U.S., the United Nations, Russia, and the
European Union, presented the final details of the Road Map on April 30, 2002. Despite
the efforts of Bush to directly engage himself in the peace process, the Road Map made
little headway. The authors blame the lack of traction in implementing the Road Map to
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Israel Lobby who supported him.
Mearsheimer and Walt present several points of evidence allegedly
demonstrating that the Israel Lobby frustrated efforts to implement the Road Map, and
caused the U.S. to support Israeli unilateralism. One way in which the authors note the
Israel Lobby influenced U.S. policy was through Mort Zuckerman, the chairman of the
Conference of Presidents, labeling the Road Map to Peace the “road map to nowhere” 27.

27
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The Israel Lobby also sought to influence the Road Map to Peace through voicing
criticism at a White House meeting with Condoleezza Rice 28.
To put additional pressure on Bush, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) drafted a letter that it circulated on Capitol Hill calling for Bush to scale down
the pressure he was applying to Israel and to require the Palestinians to fully meet the
Road Map’s security conditions before Israel would be required to concede anything 29.
This letter was eventually signed by a total of 368 congressmen, including all but fifteen
from the Senate. While AIPAC would eventually lend conditional support to the Road
Map, it did not seek to promote it. This lack of backing by AIPAC leads Mearsheimer and
Walt to reason that since AIPAC did not campaign for the peace plan, it allowed other
pro-Israel groups to torpedo the Road Map 30. According to the authors, the Israeli
government had also been assured by two neocons working within the National Security
Council that the United States would not come to bear pressure on Israel over the Road
Map 31.
When Israel began constructing the “security fence” within the occupied
territories, the Bush administration again attempted to exert pressure on the Jewish
state. According to the Israelis, the fence was being constructed to stop the influx of
Palestinian suicide bombers. While there may have been some truth to this reasoning,
the fact that the fence in many places was being constructed within the Palestinian side
of the green line raised questions as to whether Israel was trying to expropriate territory.
In response to growing unease within the White House over the fence, the Bush
administration threatened to withhold $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel. Supporters

28

Ibid.
Ibid.
30
Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 214
31
Ibid.
29

19

of Israel in Congress did not take this threat sitting down and ensured Israel that they
would receive the full loan guarantees 32.
To further thwart the Road Map and move toward their preferred policy of
unilateralism, the Israelis again mobilized the Israel lobby. In this instance it was felt in
the form of Elliot Abrams who met with Ariel Sharon in Rome 33. At this secret meeting in
Rome, the Israeli leader informed Abrams that he would be pursuing unilateralism
instead of the Road Map. While the Palestinians could claim the Gaza Strip, a large
portion of the West Bank would become part of Israel proper 34. As the authors note, this
policy would dictate what the Palestinians would receive, meaning in the end they would
not have their own state 35.
Presumably, an influencing factor in the U.S. accepting Israeli policy change was
Abrams. For the authors identify Abrams as belonging to the Israel Lobby, as well as
being a prominent neoconservative and director of the Near East and North African
Affairs on the National Security Council. Through this tenuous evidence and the facts
laid out above, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Israel Lobby influenced America to
discard the Road Map.
Mearsheimer and Walt note that the Conference of Presidents, which is part of
the Israel lobby, backed the unilateralist shift, with between 60 and 75 percent of the proIsrael leaders viewing it favorably 36. This data is contrasted against polling results which
show that 55 percent of Americans had a favorable view of the Road Map, and when
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given more information the level of support rose to 74 percent 37. Thus, the authors claim
the Israel lobby was able to effectively mobilize against American public opinion, and
influence American foreign policy in support of unilateralism.
Despite these intense efforts by the Israel Lobby, the unilateralist policy by Israel
was not to last. After withdrawing from and isolating the Gaza Strip, the Israelis faced
rocket attacks from Gaza and had two of their soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah. These
actions caused the Israelis to reassess their unilateralist policy. In the end, the Israelis
came to the realization that if they withdrew from the West Bank they would face many
of the same problems as they did in Gaza and southern Lebanon 38. Accordingly, the
Israelis shifted their policy back to negotiating a two state solution with the Palestinians.

The Neoconservatives
Before the publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy much of the scholarly
focus on the neoconservative movement was not as part of the Israel Lobby, but rather
as a standalone actor. Joel Beinin takes this view when arguing that “it is not the case
that Israel and its Jewish supporters in the second Bush administration have somehow
hijacked U.S. Middle East policy to promote a war with Iraq” 39. Instead, he argues there
is an overlap between the interests of neo-conservatives and the pro-Israel lobby. The
overlap was found in the Bush administration’s desire to impose its hegemonic ambitions
on the world, whereas the pro-Israel lobby sought to exploit Bush’s agenda to further
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Israel’s interests 40. Beinin argues America’s foreign policy is not only driven by the Israel
lobby, but also through the neoconservatives who seek to influence U.S. policy.
Beinin notes how the neocon think tank Project for a New American Century
(PNAC) attempted to influence American foreign policy formulation through sending a
letter to President Clinton in 1998 advocating that the U.S. attack Iraq. When Clinton did
not act upon their call, PNAC sent letters to the Republican Speaker of the House and
Senate Majority Leaders, asking them to advocate a war with Iraq. Although the letters
to the influential Republican Congressmen did not bring about the desired change in
policy, PNAC was able to gain passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, which
“announced the switch in US Iraq policy from disarmament to regime change” 41.
Finally the author states how those of the neo-conservative persuasion and the
Israeli lobby converged with the election of George W. Bush. Richard Perle in being
named to the Defense Policy Board of the second Bush administration argued that
regardless of a lack of evidence connecting Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, Iraq
should be considered as part of the War on Terror 42. WINEP and the neocon
administration also pursued an Israeli policy which did not require Israel to negotiate with
the Palestinians because the conditions were not right, all the while allowing the Jewish
state to continue creating facts on the ground 43. In sum, Beinin claims the neocons
pursued an Israel policy that would further American hegemony, while also furthering
Israeli interests.
Kathleen Christison focuses on the forces that shaped Bush’s policy toward
Israel. The author notes how those of the neoconservative persuasion have long had an
40
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interest in reshaping the Middle East, dating back to the Reagan administration. The
neocons have long sought to overturn the Oslo process, for they believed it was
weakening Israel through territorial concessions 44. The neoconservatives have also
sought to implement their policy preferences through think tanks, which offer pro-Israel,
hawkish advice to policymakers. Further, many of those who belong to the
neoconservative persuasion can be found in crucial areas of government. As evidence,
the author states that neoconservative theoreticians worked within the subcabinet level
of the second Bush administration. These individuals drafted policy, which was then
endorsed and carried out by the neocons at the senior levels of government 45.
While it is has been shown that the neoconservatives seek to influence the
American government in support of Israel, more should be drawn out as to why the
neocons hold this preference. Max Boot, himself a neoconservative, claims the common
thread of the neocon movement has been advocacy of “aggressive and, if necessary,
unilateral action by the United States to promote democracy, human rights, and free
markets and to maintain U.S. primacy around the world” 46. Boot draws out how the term
neocon has become synonymous with the term “Jew” simply because some members of
the movement are Jewish. Boot claims this should not imply that the neoconservative
movement reflects an ethnic tie. Instead the author claims neoconservativism should be
seen as an ideological position. Yet critics continue to relate the two terms, allowing for
the old dual-loyalties canard to be resurrected. This dual loyalties charge was most
pronounced with the invasion of the Iraq War, with some critics charging the neocons of
doing Israel’s bidding 47.
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The author states that instead of seeing defense of Israel in religious or ethnic
terms, it should be understood as defending shared liberal democratic values. Further,
the author claims defense of Israel is justified as the American public supports the
Jewish state. This supposed support stems from the appreciation Americans have for
Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East and the knowledge that we share the
same enemies 48.
Kevin MacDonald argues the neocons have been influenced by Straussian ideals
to pursue democracy promotion in the Middle East. One such ideal advocated by
Strauss is the adoption of the in-group/out-group languages. According to the author,
Strauss believed that to communicate to out-groups an exoteric language should be
adopted to frame issues as a larger public concern 49. Internally the exclusive group
would use an esoteric language to communicate their real interest to one another 50. For
example, Michael Lind has brought attention to the neocons exoteric language in calling
for democracy promotion, while embracing the Straussian esoteric views of democracy
by rule of the manipulative elite 51. Neoconservatives have applied this doublespeak in
supporting the democratic state of Israel and its apartheid-like policies The author claims
that in Israel “democracy is little more than an instrument of ethnic warfare rather than
an expression of Western universalism” 52.
In further efforts to deceive the public, MacDonald claims the neocons within the
Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense, used the mass appeal language of
“weapons of mass destruction” and Al-Qaeda to frame the conflict with Iraq. The
neocons included in this deception were Abram Shulsky, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas
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Feith. MacDonald mentions that Shulsky received his Ph.D. under Strauss, while Feith
was a longtime member of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and the
Zionist Organization of America. The author claims the disinformation crafted by this
department was more readily acceptable than selling the war to the American public as
an attempt to achieve Israeli foreign policy aims 53.
Gary Leupp adds to the neocon literature with his claim that within America there
is a sizeable amount of the population who believes the U.S. should transform the
Middle East and guarantee Israel’s security based upon a reading of the book of
Revelations. As a result of the strong religious fervor surround eschatological beliefs,
neoconservatives have found it beneficial to manipulate the language of religion in order
to implement their chosen policy preferences 54. Ultimately this framing of policy has little
to do with religion, and more properly should be understood in terms of the neocon’s
view that American and Israeli interests are nearly identical.

The Jewish Diaspora
Another group Mearsheimer and Walt identify as belonging to the Israel Lobby is the
American Jewry. This is certainly not a homogenous group in regards to policy
preferences toward Israel. Theodore Sasson frames the topic of the Jewish Diaspora
through that of lobbying. He asserts that since 1993 most lobbying on behalf of Israel
occurred through a direct engagement model. This method of lobbying departed from
mass mobilization as the dominant means of lobbying since 1948. As a result of the shift
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in lobbying practices, organizations no longer felt the requirement to mirror the policy of
Israel and instead sought to further their own preferences.

Sasson states that between 1948 and 1993 the Israel lobby sought to influence
Congress for the purpose of seeing Israeli and American interests as shared. This
framing of interest allowed for the Jewish Diaspora to press Congress to support military
and economic aid to Israel in an effort to keep them safe from the surrounding
totalitarian countries. While there were sources of contention within the Jewish diasporic
lobby, as a whole they tended to support U.S. policies that were favorable to the Jewish
state 55.

The shift in policy stance after 1993 occurred as a result of the Oslo Accords and
Netanyahu’s trip to the U.S. to rally Jewish opposition. The right-wing Zionist
Organization of America (ZOA) was the first and most ardent supporter of Netanyahu’s
case during his trip to the U.S. The ZOA actively lobbied the U.S. congress to attach
conditions to any assistance to the Palestinian Authority, which was against the wishes
of both the Israel government and pro-Israel U.S. groups. Since the Oslo Accords and
the Netanyahu trip, groups within the Israel Lobby from both the left and right have been
less hesitant to lobby for policies that Israel itself may not favor 56.

John Newhouse focuses on the impact of foreign lobbyists on foreign policies
that are beneficial to their home state. The author notes how the use of foreign lobbyists
to achieve foreign policy aims reflects a growing trend in the “privatization of
diplomacy” 57. Newhouse claims one reason for the decline in traditional diplomacy may
be that foreign lobbyists have the ability to identify with a domestic ethnic bloc that has a
55
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significant influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy 58. These lobbying groups can also be
understood as surrogates of the mother country who are able to put forth uncomfortable
arguments and arrangements on Capitol Hill, which the mother country through
traditional diplomacy cannot 59.
The ability of foreign lobbyists to navigate the American political system is a
result of the open trade and investment climate that they help to promote 60. Foreign
lobbyists claim that their work is indistinguishable from that of domestic lobbyists, a point
which Newhouse openly refutes. As the author notes, lobbying by foreign firms can
serve to “challeng[e] the sensible and balanced formation of foreign policy” 61.
Newhouse states AIPAC is the very best lobbying group that aims to change
U.S. foreign policy. Although not registered as a foreign lobby, AIPAC has been able to
influence American foreign policy in support of Israel through a variety of methods.
These methods include playing off internal rivalries within Congress and Congressional
committees, prompting members to inundate Congressmen with angry calls, and making
reelection campaigns difficult for those Congressmen who do not vote in accordance
with their preferences 62.
As a potential counter to the power of AIPAC within the Israel lobby, a newer
domestic group called J-Street has emerged to advocate a pro-Israel, pro-peace
position 63. However, the ability of J-Street to change American foreign policy towards
Israel in a more pro-peace direction faces an uphill battle for several reasons. First,
Congressmen on Capitol Hill have become conditioned to acting in favor of the wishes of
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AIPAC, who are considered the professionals of Washington politics. Second, the
members of AIPAC are much more numerous than those of J-Street and tend to favor
hard-line positions. Third, there is a deep fear of Arab intentions, causing most Jews to
favor AIPAC’s more hawkish policies 64.
Beinin also acknowledges that AIPAC is “a significant force” in American Middle
Eastern policy, especially after the 1967 Six-Day War 65. He also sees the founding of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in 1985 as an important organization
that influences Middle East policy. This importance began with WINEP publishing its
1988 report titled "Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East." This
report, which was prepared for the incoming president, advocated not engaging the
Palestinians until conditions were fully in Israel’s favor.
While this report by itself did not cause a fundamental shift in U.S. policy towards
Israel, the author notes that six members of the committee which drafted the report
joined the first Bush administration. Hence, the author states that after the first Gulf War,
when the first Bush administration sought to reward its Arab allies for their cooperation
through the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the U.S. did not force Israel to
negotiate with the PLO 66. The author also remarks that WINEP has been successful in
advocating the belief to the American government that Israel is not a liability in the
spread against Islamism but in fact is a “reliable ally” 67.
The author goes on to demonstrate how WINEP has been involved in advancing
the cause of Israel within subsequent administrations. For example, Beinin discusses
how former WINEP member Martin Indyk became the Special Assistant to the President
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and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security
Council for President Clinton 68. Indyk is probably best known for the policy drafted while
at WINEP known as “dual containment.” Once Indyk was officially working for the Clinton
administration this policy was implemented for the purpose of isolating two of America’s
enemies during the 1990’s, Iran and Iraq. In relation, this policy also served to contain
Israel’s two most dangerous adversaries.
Mahmood Mamdani, in looking for causal explanations to explain the U.S.
support for Israel, claims scholars have begun to look more closely at the influence of
the Israel Lobby. He states that while critics have traditionally looked at oil as the driving
force of American foreign policy in the Middle East, Israel after 9/11 has become a
central explanation to U.S. policy in the region 69. The author notes as the costs of
America’s Israel policy have increased over the years, it has become increasingly
difficult to rationalize how it is beneficial to U.S. interests.
Mamdani claims the most powerful groups within the Israel lobby are AIPAC and
the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. These groups
and others within the lobby function as an “ethnic donor machine” which coordinate
around economic and social issues, as opposed to just organizing behind particular
candidates 70. In addition to using their power to influence economic and social issues,
the Israel lobby seeks to appoint representative friendly to their interests within
government. For example, Mamdani notes the appointments of long term veterans of the
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U.S. and Israeli defense and foreign policy establishments, Richard Perle and Douglas
Feith, to positions of influence over Israel policy within the second Bush administration 71.

Christian Zionists

The final group Mearsheimer and Walt identify as belonging to the Israel Lobby are
Christian Zionists. Donald Wagner illustrates the detailed history of the interactions
between Christian Zionism and the U.S. government starting with the Christian Zionist
William Blackstone. This prominent Christian Zionist organized a major newspaper
campaign in 1891 with a petition signed by 400 prominent Americans. The campaign,
which preceded Theodor Herzl’s World Zionist Congress by six years, called for
President Harrison to create a Jewish national homeland in Palestine 72. Thus, Wagner
claims that America Christian Zionists have an extensive history of seeking to recreate
biblical Israel through lobbying public officials.

Yaakov Ariel details the history of Christian Zionism, and claims its earliest traces
can be found in seventeenth century with Protestant Messianic groups. These particular
Protestants tended to read the bible literally, and thus believed that the Jews needed to
restore the kingdom of Israel 73. According to the author, in the nineteenth century
Christian Messianism split between the “historical” and “futurist” branches. While both
groups agreed that God had a special plan for Jews in the holy land and that Christian
Messianic groups should be involved with conversion efforts involving Jews, Christian
Zionists differed as to when the end times would actually occur. The historical branch
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focused on identifying current events within the biblical passages, while the futurist
branch saw God’s plan as still being played out. Eventually the futurist branch would
become the leading view of Christian Zionism, especially in America 74.

The author expounds on this futurist branch, or the premillenialist
dispensationalists, stating these followers believe in the last days all those who
committed themselves to Jesus will be saved in the rapture. In addition to these
individuals, all those who died before the rapture are to rise from the dead and meet with
Jesus in heaven. These individuals will come to stay with Jesus for seven years (or three
and a half years by some accounts), while those on Earth experience the evils of the
anti-Christ. During the time both the Christians and Jesus are away from Earth, the Jews
will return to Israel without accepting Jesus and instead accept the anti-Christ as their
ruler. When Jesus eventually returns to Earth, premillenialist believe he will battle with
and defeat the anti-Christ, causing some Jews to accept him as the savior. Ultimately, by
the end of the battle about two-thirds of humanity will have been killed 75.In accordance
with this belief, premillenialist supporters see any move to trade “land for peace” as a
move against God’s divine plan.

Paul S. Boyer claims evangelicals saw the second Bush administration’s foreign
policy as the catalyst to the divine plan. This claim reflects polling showing over forty
percent of Americans believing there is a divine plan that will occur sequentially 76. In
anticipation of the end of days, dispensationalist’ Christians throughout history have
identified many different leaders and institutions as the embodiment of the anti-Christ.
This list includes Saladin, the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein, the European Union, and
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the United Nations 77. The author believes the strong religious beliefs within the United
States inspired George W. Bush to frame American foreign policy in theological terms in
order to galvanize support amongst evangelicals. It is claimed this framing expressed to
evangelicals their desirable belief that they were living in the final stages of history 78.
Colin Shindler traces the evolution of the Christian Zionist movement, noting how
early dispensationalist thinking broke with the traditional understanding of the church
being the “new Israel” 79. Viewing the church as the new Israel was based upon the belief
that the Jews had been exiled from Israel and were unlikely to return in the future. This
dispensationalist view was eventually altered and instead it was posited that the while
the church remained favored in God’s eye, the Jews would remain a chosen people. To
the dispensationalists, when the Messiah ultimately returned and many Jews were
converted to Christianity, “the Jewish character of Jesus’” millennial reign will be
paramount and the Church’s role would be almost secondary 80.
Melani McAlister argues that there is an emerging consensus between traditional
religious social conservatism and evangelical radical liberalism which sees the end-times
prophecies as imminent and Israel as the central component in the end of days. In
viewing these apocalyptic prophecies as happening in their midst, the Christian Right
have called for close ties with Israel and support for the Jewish state’s Middle East
policy. While championing support for Israel is not new amongst the Christian Right, the
author claims that within the second Bush administration contemporary Christian
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Zionists seemed to be more successful than past attempts at influencing Middle East
policies 81.
McAlister traces the importance of American evangelicalism back to John Darby
and the Scofield Reference Bible. The author notes this particular bible’s interpretations
provided generations of evangelicals with the belief that the bible’s accuracy can be
tested against political developments 82. In particular, these developments are contrasted
against events involving Israel, as the bible predicts that the Jews will return to their
homeland, an anti-Christ will emerge, and both Jews and Christians will be killed for their
beliefs.
Eventually the prophecy holds that there will be a mass conversion of Jews as
they come to realize that Jesus is the true Messiah. Israel will then face the most
powerful nations of the world, who will have grouped together to destroy the Jewish
nation. Before the ultimate battle occurs, the bible holds that Jesus will return to defeat
the anti-Christ, ushering in one thousand years of peace 83.
Robert O. Smith explores the theological influences on the relationship between
Israel and the United States. The author gives particular attention to Christian Zionism
and its relationship with American Jews. This special relationship has enabled a
successful lobbying campaign since it frames the Jewish ethnic groups’ policy in terms
of American values that are consistent with U.S. national interest 84.
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The author notes that Christian support of Israel has a long history dating back to
the days of the early church 85. Occurring in the mid-nineteenth century the theological
perspective known as premillenialist dispensationalism supported the restoration of
Israel as a homeland for the Jews. Key historical thinkers for the premillenialist
dispensationalist movement include and Henry Finch, Louis Way, John Nelson Darby,
and C.I. Scofield. These premillenialist thinkers believed that history is divided into
distinct eras (dispensations), which are defined by how God interacts with particular
groups. The movement holds that in the seventh and final dispensation Jesus will return
to defeat evil and rescue His believers 86.
Mark Beeson asserts that the American evangelical movement won the 2000
presidency for George W. Bush, and the movement continues to exert a growing
influence over national policy. The author remarks how the evangelical movement
passionately backed George W. Bush because they saw his beliefs as genuine, making
him their “political and religious leader” 87. This deep influence of the evangelical
movement in not only selecting the president but also in policy formation is seen as a
“form of ‘political fundamentalism’ that is reshaping American politics” 88.
The reshaping of American politics was a result of marriage between
neoconservatism and evangelicals which brought conflicting goals in relation to Israel.
Many of the neocon persuasion share with the evangelical movement deep attachments
to Israel and support for a strong Jewish state. However, the neocons do not share the
sentiments of the Christian Zionist movement who support Israel as a result of a literal
reading of the book of Revelations. These Christian Zionists hold that the kingdom of
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Israel needs to be reestablished to initiate the return of Christ, ushering in the end of
days and hell on Earth for all unbelievers. While this belief remained an ongoing point of
contention between neoconservatives and Christian Zionists, these groups remained
influential in shaping American support for Israel 89.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY I: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CHRISTIAN ZIONIST
LOBBY

Findings
Of the seven Christian Zionist organizations under study, four had a 501(c)(3) listing with
IRS. According to the IRS website this meant these organizations cannot use their
earnings to “inure to any private shareholder or individual. In addition, it may not be an
action organization, i.e., it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of
its activities and it may not participate in any campaign activity for or against political
candidates” 90 The key word in this description is “substantial.” This word alone means
that these organizations can to a degree lobby some politicians, but they cannot
incorporate “too much” lobbying into their activities 91. Subsequently, these Christian
Zionist organizations may keep their tax exempt status by engaging in limited attempts
at influencing legislation.
Amongst the Christian Zionists Lobby, the most common form of lobbying was
mass mobilization. The Christian Zionists groups in this study often sent out e-mails,
newsletters, or press releases to call on their constituency to contact politicians with proIsrael messages. In making contact with political representatives, the Christian Zionist
Lobby hoped to alter American legislation in a pro-Israel direction. While it is hard to
measure the amount of influence contacting one’s official carries, given that considering
90
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measuring the intent of a public official is impossible, this method of influence should still
be considered an important variable. For some members of Congress hold strong
religious views and any contact made by their constituents may reinforce these views
and prompt them to pursue pro-Israel legislation.
Another way in which the Christian Zionist could lobby public officials was to
make monetary contributions. While only CIPAC claimed to be an actually lobby, other
Christian Zionists individually or collectively make donations to politicians with pro-Israel
positions. While the data was unattainable to make precise connections between those
donating to PAC’s and their political recipients, certain broad measures were found. This
data can be found in Table 1.
Yet, the data from Table 1 does not imply that Pro-Israel donations came
exclusively from Christian Zionists. The table does indicate the financial strength of
those that the Christian Zionist Lobby counts as allies. Accordingly, the financial
contributions to these politicians by Christian Zionists allows for these individuals to
remain in areas of influence over Israel policy. These politicians can then work to alter
the interests of America towards Israel through the pursuit of a premillenialist agenda.
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Table 1: Campaign Committee & Leadership PAC Combined by Pro- Israel
Industry*

politician
**Richard Armey
^Shelley Berkley
^Roy Blunt
**Tom Delay
**James Inhofe
^Joe Lieberman

01-02
03-04
05-06
0
N/A
N/A
153,536 122,570 122,750
5,500
38,350
29,150
71,650
82,250
91,450
46,550
47,550
51,550
230,710 244,486 1,194,640

*in dollars by election cycle
**identified as Christian Zionist by Mearsheimer/Walt
^ Associated with CUFI
Source: opensecrets.org (online:
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index.php)

Another common method of lobbying by Christian Zionist was holding rallies. The
impact of this form of lobbying is difficult to measure. Rallies certainly hold the benefit of
allowing a group of people to gather to share ideas about how to achieve their common
preferences. Rallies also, if impactful enough, can persuade political leaders to change
course and pursue an alternate policy. A third outcome of rallies can be that they garner
media attention, which in turn may draw more participants to a cause. This media
attention could influence politicians with strong religious convictions and persuade them
to further premillenialist preferences. In addition, the size of the rallies could be used as
evidence to persuade politicians to follow premillenialist preferences.
Finally, it was worth noting that as with the Israel Lobby, the Christian Zionist
Lobby is not a homogeneous group. The Christian Zionists Lobby includes both
Christians and Jews from a range of denominations. Moreover, support for Christian
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Zionism can be found in both the Democratic and Republican parties. Table 2 provides
how these politicians identify both politically and religiously.

Table 2: Religions and Parties of Politicians who associate the Christian Zionist
Lobby

politician

religion

party

**Richard Armey

Methodist

Rep.

*Shelley Berkley

Jewish

Dem.

*Roy Blunt

Baptist

Rep.

**Tom Delay

Baptist

Rep.

**James Inhofe

Presbyterian

Rep.

*Joe Lieberman

Jewish

Indep.

*associated with CUFI
**identified as Christian Zionist by
Mearsheimer/Walt
Source: Religious Affiliations of U.S. Congress (online:
http:www.adherents.com/adh_congress.html)

Christians United for Israel
According to the CUFI Facebook page, Christians United for Israel was incorporated into
John Hagee Ministries in 2006. In addition to seeking out details on the organization
structure of CUFI from its website, data from the BBB and IRS websites pertaining to
CUFI and John Hagee Ministries was sought. However, the BBB and IRS websites did
not have any data on the organizational structure of CUFI or John Hagee Ministries.
39

The relevant information provided by the CUFI website was in regards to the
organization’s statement of purpose, goals and objectives, and associations with
religious and political leaders. The website states CUFI’s purpose is to “provide a
national association through which every pro-Israel church, parachurch organization,
ministry or individual in America can speak and act with one voice in support of Israel in
matters related to Biblical issues” 92. The national association that is CUFI grew from a
2006 meeting involving 400 Christian leaders discussing how best to respond to threats
against Israel. Since this time CUFI has become “the largest pro-Israel organization in
the United States and one of the leading Christian grassroots movements in the world” 93.
This includes having church memberships in all fifty states. CUFI also organizes proIsrael events throughout the year, as well as a Washington Summit to “make their voices
heard in support of Israel and the Jewish people” 94.
The CUFI website lists its first goal is “to educate Christians about the Biblical
and moral imperatives about supporting Israel” 95. The second listed goal is “to
communicate Pro-Israel perspectives to our neighbors, newspapers and elected
officials” 96. Religious leaders associated with CUFI according to the website are Gary
Bauer, Jonathan P. Falwell, Keith A Butler, David Brog, Mac Hammond, Michael Little,
and John C. Hagee. American Political leaders posting endorsements of CUFI on the
organization’s website include Joseph Lieberman, Shelley Berkley, and Roy Blunt.
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National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel
The National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI) is listed as a 501(c)(3)
charity on the IRS website. However, there are no records of the NCLCI on the BBB
website. Also, the NCLCI website was down for two weeks before recently becoming
operational again. Efforts to explain the inaccessibility of the NCLCI website were
unsuccessful, while the media materials search indicated the organization is still active.

The NCLCI website describes the organization as being “active in local events on
Israel, the Holocaust and Christian-Jewish relations” 97. The website claims the NCLCI
issues public statements regarding important events surrounding Israel. The website
also state the NCLCI seeks to further its preferences through making presentations at
national conferences, publishing papers, monitoring denominational publications for
inaccurate reporting, and conducting fact-finding missions in Israel 98.

Unity Coalition for Israel

The Unity Coalition for Israel (UCI) is listed as a 501(c)(3) charity on the IRS website.
Yet there are no records of the UCI on the BBB website. The UCI website states UCI
was founded in July 1991 through an alliance of Christian and Jewish organizations as a
way of supporting Israel. The website claims that with the organization’s 200
autonomous partners it is “the largest network of Pro-Israel groups in the world” 99. UCI
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claims these autonomous partners include “churches, synagogues, prayer networks,
think tanks and thousands of individuals” 100 comprising more than 40 million Americans.

The stated mission of UCI is “to focus the efforts of secular and religious
organizations and individuals for whom the existence of the State of Israel is central and
essential to the future of the free world” 101. To further this mission, the website states the
UCI regularly contacts the media through e-mail. This media includes 700 religious radio
stations, 245 Christian TV stations, and all secular media. In addition UCI contacts
secular newspapers and magazines, 120 Christian newspapers, and 70 Jewish
newspapers.

According to the website, UCI furthers its message by holding “monthly educational
meetings in Washington, D.C. for member organizations and congressional staffers on
Capitol Hill, which feature knowledgeable speakers on current issues” 102. The
organization also “publishes pro-Israel resolutions and policy statements/position papers
on current critical issues” 103. Finally, UCI holds “press conferences on dominant issues in the Capitol, at the National Press Club and at the National Religious Broadcasters
annual convention - with leaders of national stature” 104.

Christian Friends of Israeli Communities

The Christian Friends of Israeli Communities is listed as a 501(c)(3) charity on the IRS
website. The BBB website provided the most basic contact information and listed the
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CFOIC as a non-profit organization. The CFOIC website states the organization was
founded in 1995 in response to the Oslo Process. The organization saw these moves as
devastating, since they gave Jewish lands to the Arabs. The CFOIC in response to any
territorial conciliatory moves by Israel works to support Jewish communities in order to
fulfill Biblical prophecy.

The mission of the CFOIC is to “build bridges of love and mutual respect
between Christians and Jews” 105. These bridges may include the CFOIC “adopt-asettlement” program which provides financial support for Israeli settlements and projects
they undertake. The website claims that thousands of individuals have contributed to this
adopt-a-settlement program and made a real difference for these communities. The
CFOIC also encourages Christians to visit Jewish communities in Biblical Israel in order
to become better connected with the people living there.

Christians’ Israel Public Action Committee

Christians’ Israel Public Action Committee (CIPAC) was not listed as a charity on the
IRS website. This was to be suspected as the CIPAC website labels the organization as
a lobby. However, when searching for CIPAC on opensecrets.org, no listing was found
on the website of this organization as a lobby. There was also no listing of the
organization on the BBB website.

As mentioned, the CIPAC website states that the organization is a registered
U.S. lobby. It adds that CIPAC was founded in 1989 by Richard Hellman in order to
“educate and mobilize Christians to act on behalf of sound laws and policies regarding
105
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Israel in the U.S. Congress” 106. This mobilization involves a grassroots push for
members to write, call, or fax elected officials in support of Israel.

According to the website CIPAC represents those who wish to see Israel fulfill its
biblical prophecy. Thus, as the website claims, “If Israel is to survive, no new Palestinian
state should be created” 107. This mission, CIPAC claims, sets them apart from other
lobbying groups as they are the only ones who clearly oppose a two-state solution,
which in effect makes them the “completely Pro-Israel Lobby” 108.

International Christian Embassy Jerusalem
The International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ) was listed as a charity on the IRS
website. When visiting the BBB website there was no listing of the organization. The
ICEJ website states it was founded in 1980 by Christians as an act of solidarity with the
Jewish people’s claim to Israel. Today the ICEJ claims to represent millions of people
from over 125 countries, with active representation in eighty countries and over fifty full
time staff. This staff regularly publishes position papers, pamphlets, tapes, DVD’s, and
other teaching materials in support of Israel. The ICEJ website also states it is the
world’s largest Christian Zionist organization.
The ICEJ works to “comfort Israel, educate the Church, celebrate God’s
faithfulness, and confront anti-Semitism” 109. This mission is carried out through multiple
outlets. One such way is through supporting social assistance projects, which include
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taking care of the “needs of children, elderly, disabled, lone soldiers, new immigrants
and needy families” within Israel 110. The ICEJ is also an active supporter of the aliyah,
through sponsoring transport operations to Israel.

International Fellowship of Christians and Jews
The International Fellowship of Christians and Jews (IFCJ) is listed on the IRS website
as 501(c)(3) charity. It also has extensive records on BBB website. According to the
BBB, the IFCJ was incorporated in Illinois in 1983. The IFCJ also has affiliates in
Canada and Israel. It’s stated purpose is "to support and assist institutions providing
religious and secular education, social services or charitable aid in the Holy Land of
Israel; assist Jews in need around the world; to seek the support of religious
communities in the United States and create bridges of cooperation between them; and
to create links between American religious communities, the Jewish people and the Holy
Land of Israel" 111 . The IFCJ has four programs operating within it. These programs are
On Wings of Eagles, Isaiah 58, Guardians of Israel, and Stand for Israel. In 2006 the
expenses of these four programs were the following: On Wings of Eagles $18,961,727;
Guardians of Israel $16,460,598; Isaiah 58 $12,842,026; and Stand for Israel $319,381.
The BBB lists the chief executive of the IFCJ as Yechiel Eckstein who is paid an
annual compensation of $581,411. The board size of the IFCJ is sixteen people with the
Chair of the Board listed as John P. French and Robert R. Mazer as co-chair of the
board. The paid staff size of the IFCJ totals fifty-five people.
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The methods of fundraising include direct mail, telemarketing, print
advertisements, television, radio, internet appeals, planned giving, and cause-related
marketing. Fund raising costs in 2006 were 14% of related contributions. The related
contributions stemmed from donations received from fund raising activities and totaled
$72,616,244. Informational materials and activities cost the IFCJ $31,005,107 in 2006.
Out of this total, $17,942,318 went to program expenses; $10,462,683 went to program
expenses; and $2,600,106 went to administrative expenses.
The major source of funds for the IFCJ in 2006 came from contributions which
totaled $72,103,303. Investment income brought in $1,493,988 for the IFCJ, while
catalog sales provided additional income of $512,941. Tour, conferences, and other
income was the least profitable component of revenue for the IFCJ bringing in $105,079.
Following this extensive overview of the IFCJ by the BBB, the organization’s
website adds very little. The website states Rabbi Eckstein has devoted his life to
building bridges between Christian and Jews in support of Israel 112. The mission stated
on the website is to “reverse [the] 2,000-year history of discord [between Christians and
Jews] and replace it with a relationship marked by dialogue, understanding, respect and
cooperation” 113.

Stand for Israel
Stand for Israel is easily the most confusing organization to understand out of all the
Christian Zionist organizations researched. In fact it may not even be properly
categorized as an organization, as the BBB regards it as a program within the IFCJ.
Nevertheless, Stand for Israel is not listed on the IRS website. Nor are there records of
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Stand for Israel on BBB website. Attempts were also made unsuccessfully to contact
Stand for Israel through both e-mail and phone.
The link to Stand for Israel is directly linked to the IFCJ website, while its website
provides little information about its organizational structure. Mearsheimer and Walt state
Stand for Israel was founded in 2002 through an alliance with Ralph Reed and the IFCJ.
However, this information is nowhere to be found on the Stand for Israel website.
The mission statement that is available on the website and it calls on members to
“translate love and commitment for Israel and the Jewish people into action” 114. A
statement within the BBB website for the IFCJ states Stand for Israel is “an effort to
strategically mobilize leadership and grassroots support in the Christian community for
the State of Israel” 115. This mobilization is done through contacting local officials and
informing them that the U.S. should keep strong ties with Israel. The Stand for Israel
website also calls on members to ask local officials to meet with their church or civic
group to discuss Israel. The website advises members to also educate themselves with
their representatives voting record on Israel. Finally, members are instructed to be an
advocate through monitoring the media for Israeli bias and then writing e-mails and
letters to the media to hold them accountable.
The Stand for Israel website also has a link to make donations. This link brings
members to a page involving four different groups, one of which is Stand for Israel. A
donation to Stand for Israel will support “engag[ing] people both spiritually and politically
on behalf of Israel and the Jewish people by encouraging them to pray for Israel and
teaching them to advocate for the Jewish state” 116. The other groups are Guardians for
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Israel, Isaiah 58, and Wings of Eagles. A donation to Guardians of Israel will provide
“food, clothing, shelter, housing and other urgent needs for all Israelis, including children
and the elderly, who are suffering due to poverty, terrorism and war” 117. A donation to
Isaiah 58 will provide “children and elderly Jews in the former Soviet Union with food,
clothing, heating, and other necessities by funding humanitarian programs throughout
the FSU” 118. A donation to On Wings of Eagles will enable Jews to “make aliyah
(immigrate to Israel) from around the world, and helps them with their klitah
(resettlement) needs once they arrive in the Holy Land” 119.
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CHAPTER IV.
CASE STUDY II: FROM THE ROAD MAP TO UNILATERLAISM
Findings
The findings of this case study were unable to neither confirm nor fail to confirm my
hypothesis. What this case study displayed was that the Christian Zionism Lobby was
opposed to both the Road Map and the Gaza disengagement component of Israeli
unilateralism. In regards to the security fence, there was not a clear lobbying effort to
stop its construction by the Christian Zionist Lobby. However, one should be careful not
to equate absence of evidence with evidence of absence. In the case of the Road Map
there was an overwhelming amount of evidence displaying Christian Zionist opposition
to the Road Map. In the case of the security fence there was a minimal amount of
evidence showing Christian Zionist support. These displays of evidence are contrasted
against the sparse amount of evidence regarding unilateralism, which ultimately leads
this research to its inconclusive conclusions.

2003
In March of 2003, President Bush delivered a speech on his Road Map to Peace that
was notable for its silence on the status of Israeli settlements. The day after this speech
in which President Bush promised to push the Road Map forward, Prime Minister Ariel
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Sharon vowed to the Israeli Knesset that settlements would remain in place 120. This
pledge by Sharon, in addition to the ongoing political erosion of the Palestinian Authority
(P.A.) and the continued construction of the security wall, worked to undermine the Road
Map before it was even officially implemented.
The continued push to stifle the Road Map and build settlements in Israel has
been assisted by the funding on the American Christian Right. These evangelical groups
provide tens of millions of dollars a year to expand settlements in the Occupied
Territories 121. When not providing financial support to Israel, Christian Zionists have
found it beneficial to provide rhetorical support. Accordingly, the NCLCI in early March
2003 issued a press release calling on the Palestinian Authority to stop making excuses
and assume responsibility for their own independent democratic state. The press release
went on to further express support for the construction of the security wall, claiming it is
every state’s responsibility to protect its citizens 122.
Concurrent to these efforts by Christian Zionist Lobby, political leaders such as
House Leader Tom Delay also voiced opposition to the Road Map. Speaking to Jewish
leaders in March 2003, DeLay claimed Israel has the right to defend itself and should not
be forced to accept agreements that put its security at risk 123. He went on to characterize
the Quartet members as being more concerned with their popularity amongst Arab
leaders than the security of the world 124.
Against the criticisms of Tom DeLay and the Christian Zionist Lobby, the Bush
Administration pushed forward the Road Map to Peace. President Bush stated publicly
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that once Arafat ceded some power and allowed a new Palestinian Prime Minister to
come to power, he would unveil the Road Map. In continuing this quest for a two-state
solution, the Palestinians were also to control violence directed against the Israelis, while
the Jewish state was to stop settlement construction 125.
While the Quartet claimed the two-state solution would bring peace to the Israelis
and Palestinians, U.S. Congressmen associated with Christian Zionism saw the Road
Map as a threat to Israel’s security. In early April 2004, both Democrat and Republican
congressman, including some of Bush’s allies, voiced their displeasure over the plan.
Speaking before Congress, DeLay claimed that "negotiating with these men . . . is folly,
and any agreement arrived at through such empty negotiations would amount to a
covenant with death" 126. DeLay would later add that the Road Map is “a confluence of
deluded thinking between European elites, elements within the State Department
bureaucracy and a significant segment of the American intellectual community" 127.
Dozens of U.S. congressman upset with the Road Map stated that they would send
President Bush a letter appealing for him to more firmly back the Sharon government. A
key Bush ally and a congressman associated with Christian Zionism by the name of Roy
Blunt signed this letter 128.
In the same month, the Christian Zionist Lobby remained diligent in opposing the
Road Map. In South Carolina, evangelicals who supported strengthening ties to Israel
paid for billboard sign along the Ayalon Highway in Israel. The billboard stated "There's
no land for peace" 129. In the United States Pat Robertson went to the TV media to

125

The Guardian: March 14, 2003
Washington Post: April 4, 2003
127
Washington Post: April 24, 2003
128
Ibid.
129
Counter Punch: April 8, 2003
126

51

lambast Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom. Robertson’s message to Shalom was:
“Who do you think you are, handing Jerusalem over to Arafat?" 130
At a “Stand for Israel” event in Washington of April 2003, sponsored by the IFCJ,
600 supporters of Israel gathered. At this gathering Tom DeLay was presented with the
friend of Israel award 131. Janet Parshall, a popular Christian radio host, addressed the
gathering telling the crowd that if she were the president of the U.S. she would classify
all Palestinians as enemies of America, take away all Palestinian territory and weapons,
dissolve all peace agreements, and eliminate Palestinian refugee camps 132. She added
that she opposes the dismantling of any Israel settlements and that the Christian
community is amongst the groups that thinks Israel should stop giving away land 133.
Despite these vociferous objections by the Christian Zionist Lobby, the unveiling
of the two-solution remained on track. For his part, Ariel Sharon in the media played the
role of peacemaker, who was ready to make painful concessions and deal with the
Palestinians 134. Yet, despite portraying himself as a man of peace, Sharon continued to
expand the settlements. Sharon also began unilaterally disengaging from the
Palestinians through the construction of the security fence before the Road Map was
even formally published. Sharon for his part claimed the security fence was the only way
to prevent terrorists from entering Israel 135.
After Abu Mazen was finally sworn in as Palestinian Prime Minister in May of
2003, the Road Map was officially unveiled by the White House. Israel immediately
claimed that despite pledges by the P.A. to reign in terrorism and curb violence, Hamas
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and Islamic Jihad remained intransigent towards Israel. Toward this end, Israel argued it
should not be bound to the original time scale set out in the Road Map or be required to
militarily disengage from West Bank towns. Regardless of these objections by Israel, the
United States remained on course with the implementation of the Road Map 136.
Israel was not the only party upset with the United States over the Road Map. In
America, the Bush administration was met with instantaneous criticism from the
Christian Zionist Lobby. The National Unity Coalition for Israel also displayed its
displeasure by partnering with another Christian Zionist organization, National Prayer
Team, to craft an online petition addressed to President Bush opposing the Road Map.
The opposition to the Road Map amongst Christian Zionists was evident, as the petition
registered more than 22,500 signatures 137. More opposition to the Road Map could be
found at an interfaith Conference between Christians and Jews where bumper stickers
were passed out to the attendees stating “pray that President Bush will honor God’s
covenant with Israel” 138. Finally, the Christian Zionists groups also voiced their criticisms
to the Road Map in publications such as The Weekly Standard and The Wall Street
Journal 139.
In May 2003 Israeli Minister of Tourism Benny Elon took a trip to the United
States for the purpose of promoting tourism to Israel. Elon, an outspoken critic of peace
with the Palestinians, used the trip to voice his opposition to the Road Map. Elon while in
the United States met with prominent Christian Zionists including Tom DeLay and Gary

136

The Guardian: May 1, 2003
Baptist Press: May 1, 2003
138
Tuscaloosa News: May 18, 2003
139
Asia Times Online: May 2, 2003
137

53

Bauer. It was expressed to Bauer by Elon that if there were to be an independent
Palestinian state, Israel would be undertaking massive security risks 140.
This belief that Israel’s security was at risk as a result of the Road Map was later
echoed by twenty-two American Christian conservative leaders. These leaders met at an
interfaith Zionist summit whose purpose was to oppose rewarding “murderous
Palestinian terrorism” with statehood 141. Out of the summit a letter arose addressed to
President Bush that stated the Road Map could lead to a disaster” 142. The leaders listed
as signatories to the letter included Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, John Hagee, Elwood
McQuaid, Janet Parshall, and Michael Little. Other Christian Zionist leaders who signed
the letter included Richard Hellman (CIPAC), Ester Levins (UCI), and David A. Lewis
(CUFI) 143.
The Christian Right also expressed its displeasure toward the Road Map through
Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network. Gordon Robertson, son of Pat, called
on viewers to write the State Department and White House regarding U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns comments on Christian and
conservative objections to the peace plan 144. Apparently the comments by Burns inferred
that Christians and conservative viewpoints of the peace plan lack common sense.
Robertson went on to add that from the Israeli point of view the Road Map was “dead in
the water” 145.
Against these pressures from the Christian Zionist Lobby, the U.S. government
remained unified in its policy stance supporting the Road Map. The same could not be
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said of the Israeli government. On May 25, 2003 the Israeli cabinet, divided in their
votes, decided to accept the terms of the Road Map. In order to protect their interests
however, the Israeli cabinet insisted that fourteen objections be inserted into the Road
Map representing a red line, which if crossed would cause Israel to withdraw from the
peace process. Two of these objections included the fate of the Israeli settlements and
the timetable for implementation 146.
In early June 2003 the Israelis, Palestinians, and U.S. were scheduled to meet to
discuss the Road Map. However, before the summit even took place Ariel Sharon made
inflammatory remarks in which he stated that Israel could not go on “holding three-anda-million people under occupation” 147. This comment was meant to imply that the Israelis
would seek to keep the occupied territories, while displacing the Palestinians. Sharon
added in a separate interview that he would not declare an “end to the occupation” at the
summit 148.
Although these comments by Sharon could have been seen as working against
the Road Map, Sharon was not labeled a roadblock to peace. Instead the IFCJ
published an editorial a week after the summit praising the American, Israeli, and P.A.
leaders for working toward peace. In the same article the IFCJ advised the leaders
involved in the Road Map to be weary of Arafat, as he was an obstacle to peace 149. The
reason for caution according to the author of the article, Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein, was
that changes in the political leadership of the Palestinian Authority had occurred in name
only. Behind the scenes Eckstein claimed Arafat still held the real power, which in turn
meant Israel could not let its guard down. The editorial went on to praise the Israeli
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leadership for including the fourteen conditions in the Road Map that would allow the
state to withdraw if Israel’s security were threatened.
While the IFCJ focused on Arafat as the destroyer of peace, Israeli began an
intensive targeted assassination campaign against the Palestinians. Israel, facing
criticism over this assassination campaign, claimed that regardless of the Road Map it
had the right to wage war against Hamas “without restrictions” 150. In response to this
assassination campaign Hamas began targeting Jewish civilians with suicide attacks.
As a consequence of the suicide attacks, the IFCJ published another editorial
claiming that the Israelis should not be required to follow the Road Map. According to the
author, Rabbi Eckstein, Israel should not allow the international community to offer
concessions to the Palestinians, since they have no desire for peace. Only after this
peaceful partner is found should Israel seek to have a lasting peace with the
Palestinians. The editorial made no mention of the Israeli targeted assassination
campaign 151.
To encourage the Israelis to reengage the Road Map and show the Palestinians
that America was serious about the Road Map, the Bush administration dispatched Colin
Powell to the region. The task for Powell was to bring the Israelis back to the negotiating
table after the spate of suicide attacks, while concurrently negotiating a cease fire with
Hamas. Within a few days of Powell visiting Israel, the Israelis assassinated another
Hamas leader, making Powell’s effort all the more difficult. In what followed, Powell was
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rather critical in his remarks, claiming the Israelis were not ready to move forward and
work toward peace 152.
Upon hearing the critical remarks by Powell regarding Israel’s sincerity towards
peace, Tom DeLay requested a meeting with President Bush’s aides. At this meeting
DeLay informed Bush’s aides that he would promote a congressional resolution in favor
of Israel’s actions 153. The Resolution “express[ed] U.S. solidarity with Israel and
condemn[ed] recent Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians” 154. DeLay framed the
vote for the resolution in the following way: ''A vote for this resolution reaffirms the
House's commitment to Israel and to the moral clarity of our war on terror. So I just urge
all members to cast that vote and join Israel's heroic stand against evil” 155.
As the peace process played on through June 2003, the criticism emanating from
the White House regarding Israel became noticeably less vocal. One such example of
this change in behavior occurred with the Gaza pullout in accordance with the Road
Map. On their way out particular towns in Gaza, Israeli soldiers destroyed everything, yet
the response from the White House was muted. Instead the Bush administration chose
to focus on the withdrawal from Gaza itself, labeling it a step in the right direction 156.
In July the White House again faced the Christian Zionist Lobby when it hosted
twenty leading Christian Zionists, including Yechiel Eckstein. These Christian Zionist
leaders met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Middle East advisor
Elliot Abrams to express their opposition to the Road Map. In response to this opposition
from such a key constituency in American politics, Rice informed the leaders that White
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House was sympathetic to their positions. Eckstein claimed that this meeting was the
first time leaders of the Christian Right discussed Israel policy with high level White
House officials 157.
Additional displeasure from the Christian Zionists Lobby regarding the Road Map
came from Gary Bauer. Americans for a Safe Israel was a group created by Bauer which
began placing billboards and distributing bumper stickers across America with a
message from Genesis stating: "And the Lord said to Jacob...'Unto thy offspring will I
give this land"' 158. Bauer also expressed the belief that any Palestinian state will be used
as a base for terrorist operations against Israel 159. Another actor within the Christian
Zionist Lobby, CFIC, also sought to influence the Road Map by donating $200,000 to
Israeli settlers in 2002 to help build new settlements 160.
In late July the Christian Zionist Lobby continued to oppose the Road Map as
Tom DeLay, before leaving on a trip to Israel, spoke against President Bush’s decision
to provide $20 million directly to the Palestinian Authority for the purpose of supporting
Abbas 161. DeLay claimed that he was not against giving the Palestinians aid, but he was
against providing aid directly to the Palestinian Authority. Implicit in DeLay’s remarks
was the notion that the P.A. was duplicitous and could not be trusted. This framing of
the P.A. as distrustful was reinforced when DeLay arrived in Israel where he claimed that
a Palestinian state cannot even be discussed until Palestinian terror was addressed 162.
In an effort supposedly to address Palestinian terror, the Israelis continued to
work on a security barrier that wound through the West Bank. President Bush with all his
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power was unable to convince Sharon to stop construction of the security wall. While it
was acknowledged that the existing wall would make the Road Map harder to
implement, the disclosure that Israel would not stop the construction of state-sponsored
settlements made achieving the Road Map a herculean task 163.
Regardless, the onus to prove they were committed to peace lay with the
Palestinians, not the Israelis. The ability to show commitment to peace was greatly
reduced by the efforts of the Israelis who increasingly made Abbas look weak to his own
people through taking steps contra to the Road Map. This weakness in turn did not allow
Abbas to crack down on Palestinian militant groups as the Israelis had requested, for he
feared it would cause a civil war 164.
With a recalcitrant Israel paired with a P.A. powerless to stop terrorism, the Road
Map began to resemble the article of appeasement the Christian Zionists claimed it to
be. Still on his trip in Israel, DeLay let the Jewish state know the U.S. stood with them as
an ally and that the U.S. would pay to be on the right side against evil. 165. For in this
battle, DeLay continued, there was no middle ground, just right and wrong 166. Thus,
DeLay sought to sooth Israeli notions that he would allow the U.S. to deal away Israeli
land while the Jewish state still faced security risks.
In the beginning of August 2003 following the deaths of four Jewish settlers,
Israel called for a halt in the withdrawal from Palestinian cities. Israel added that there
would be no further releases of Palestinian prisoners. Stopping the withdrawal from
Palestinian territories ran counter to what was agreed upon in the Road Map, while the
release of prisoners was a critical component to the truce Abbas negotiated with
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Palestinian militant groups. Israel in response claimed withdrawals and prisoner releases
would again commence once the Palestinian leadership cracked down on terrorism 167.
While Israel was playing hardball with the Palestinians, the U.S. attempted to get
tough on the Israelis. This was evident in Bush administration’s threat to freeze Israel’s
loan guarantees if they continued to build the wall through Palestinian territory. However,
the Bush administration also stated that it did not disagree with Israel’s right to build the
security wall, it just had objections with the wall’s path 168.
While the security fence was still being constructed, the Road Map was
continuing to fall apart. Throughout August violence became more frequent in Israel and
the Palestinian territories. Frustration was also apparent between Palestinian and Israel
leaders who left a meeting on August 17, 2003 without any agreements for further
withdrawals from Palestinian cities. Israel again claimed they could not undertake further
withdrawals due to threats against their security 169. Yet as Abbas received formal
permission from Arafat and began cracking down on militants, Israel again started
targeting Palestinians for assassination 170. This move by Israel was coupled with the
Israeli military once again occupying Nablus and Jenin 171.
These tumultuous days of August 2003 gave credence to Christian Zionist
organizations that stood firmly opposed to the Road Map. Leading Christian Zionist Gary
Bauer claimed the Bush administration was pushing the Israelis to make dangerous
concessions and he threatened to retaliate against these moves by asking Christian

167

The Guardian: August 5, 2003
The Guardian: August 6, 2003
169
The Guardian: August 22, 2003
170
Ibid.
171
Ibid.
168

60

voters to say home on Election Day 2004 172. Another evangelical, Ed McAteer helped to
raise $70,000 to pay for one hundred billboards to urge Christians to contact the White
House to show their displeasure over the Road Map 173. McAteer also had plans to send
out a press release to one thousand newspapers across the country indentifying
Christian individuals who regularly meet with the White House, but fail to speak out
against the Road Map 174. CIPAC also mobilized against the Road Map through
organizing a Washington rally in September 2003 in support of Israel 175.
Before CIPAC could even hold its rally in September, the Bush administration
came to the realization that the Road Map had “stalled” 176. The cumulative effect of
suicide bombings, Israeli assassination attempts, and P.A. institutional weakness had
finally derailed the peace process. Instead Israel would continue to claim that as it did
not have a credible partner in peace, and Ariel Sharon would begin to take unilateral
measures to disengage from parts of the occupied territories. These steps would include
relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensifying the construction of the security
fence.

2004
Despite the Road Map losing its drive, Christian Zionist groups were not overly
enthusiastic regarding Sharon’s unilateralism either. In fact Israeli settlers and the
Christian Right traveled to Washington in February 2004 to pressure Bush not to accept
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the pullout plan for Gaza 177. Other Christian Zionists groups claimed Sharon was guilty
of compromise and betrayal 178.
In February 2004, the American government tacitly approved Sharon’s
disengagement plan, conditional upon Israel not annexing settlements in the West Bank
nor extending the security fence through the Jordan Valley. Sharon claimed that by
ridding Israel of the Gaza Strip and pulling the military out of the West Bank, it would
leave in place a limited government that would eventually cause the Palestinians to take
control of their future and reenter peace talks. While the motives by Sharon were
questioned within the U.S., the Bush administration felt as though any movement
regarding Israel and the Palestinians was progress 179.
By April 2004 the Bush administration had given full approval to the
disengagement plan, with Bush calling Sharon’s plan “historic and courageous
actions” 180. The disengagement plan approved by Bush called for removing all
settlements in the Gaza Strip, while allowing Israel to retain control over a significant
portion of the West Bank. In addition to evacuating settlers from Gaza, the plan also
called for Israel to remove four small settlements in the West Bank. Another key
component of Bush’s approval of the disengagement plan was the American acceptance
of the Israeli right to continue building the security fence. However, President Bush
stated the fence should not be seen as a permanent political boundary 181.
In late June of 2004 the U.S. Congress also moved to acknowledge the Israeli
right to unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians. The House passed Concurrent

177

Jerusalem Post: February 13, 2004
Ekklesia: April 15, 2004
179
The Guardian: February 18, 2004
180
The Guardian: April 15, 2004
181
Ibid.
178

62

Resolution 460, sponsored by Tom DeLay, to express their “strong endorsement” of
President Bush’s support for the disengagement plan 182. In mid-July 2004 the
Democrats within Congress also drafted a platform emphasizing the close relationship
between Israel and the U.S., and the belief that the Green Line cannot be the basis for
peace negotiations with the Palestinians. This claim regarding the Green Line openly
expressed the conviction that there would not be a right of return and that Israel did have
some legitimate claims to the West Bank 183. The bill was drafted by Shelley Berkley,
another politician who associates with the Christian Zionists.
While the U.S. Congress and President was busy expressing their solidarity with
Israel’s disengagement plan, the International Court of Justice at the Hague (ICJ) was
active in deciding the legality the security fence. The ICJ rejected the Israeli claim that
the security fence was the best defense against Palestinian suicide bombers, and
instead viewed the fence as an infringement upon Palestinian rights. This ruling by
fourteen out of fifteen judges was followed by the non-binding recommendation that
Israel immediately halt construction of the fence and compensate those Palestinians
affected by its presence. The U.S. in response to this ruling claimed the ICJ was not the
proper forum to discuss the security fence, since they viewed it as a political issue that
should be dealt with through the Road Map 184. Christian Zionist, Roy Blunt added: "Both
the president and the House have recently made it clear that the United States will not
allow this power play by the United Nation's judicial arm to undermine its commitment to
Israel's security" 185.
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While the ICJ ruling over the security fence was met with disapproval by
Christian Zionists, the withdrawal from Gaza was not met with the same condemnation.
UCI issued a press release in September 2004 backing Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for a
national referendum before evacuating the Gaza Strip and four West Bank settlements.
The UCI claimed the disengagement plan may increase terrorist attacks within Israel and
could embolden countries such as Iran to attack Israel 186. The UCI release went on to
state that due to Sharon’s unwillingness to air objections to the plan within his own
cabinet and his dismissal of the idea to holding a national referendum on the issue,
critics of Israel may claim Israel is no longer a genuine democracy 187.
Notwithstanding these calls by UCI and Netanyahu to abort the disengagement
from Gaza, Ariel Sharon fully embraced this policy while officially abandoning the Road
Map in mid-September 2004. Sharon, despite previously expressing disengagement as
a step within the Road Map, stated: “Today, we are not following the Road Map. I am not
ready for this” 188. He added that Israel would stay in the West Bank territories after
disengagement and continue its war on terrorism.
Although Sharon may have believed the Road Map to be no longer binding, Tony
Blair had other ideas. In December Mr. Blair called for a meeting in early 2005 between
members of the Quartet and Abbas for the purpose of strengthening the Palestinian
Authority and getting the Road Map back on track. The proposal by Prime Minister Blair
came after the death of Arafat and the resulting reorganization of power within the
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Palestinian political community. Israel declined to attend the event but called it an
“important initiative” 189.

2005
In the early months of 2005 Christian Zionists were actively opposing both the Road Map
and the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. One Christian Zionist leader coordinated a
postcard campaign amongst churches in order to send 50,000 pieces of mail to the
White House denouncing the Road Map 190. Another Christian Zionist group planned to
travel to the Gaza Strip to protest the withdrawal, on the grounds that it violates God’s
plan 191. By April of 2005 it was reported that thousands of both Christians and Jews
were ready to join the struggle of the settlers in Gaza 192. In April 2005 the Road Map
was still actively protested against by Christian Zionist groups, as the UCI organized a
protest right outside Bush’s Crawford ranch as the American president met with Sharon.
The UCI claimed the Road Map would reward the Palestinians for their terrorism 193.
In March of 2005 as the world was preparing for Israel to remove itself from the
settlements in the Gaza Strip, Israel moved to build 3,500 more homes in the West
Bank. The new settlements would connect Maale Adumim with Jerusalem, thereby
allowing Israel to further consolidate control around Jerusalem. To his critics, Sharon
answered that he was not violating any tenets of the Road Map, for the U.S. had
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assured him that Israel would retain control over any major settlement blocs in a peace
agreement 194.
By July 2005, Israel remained a month away from the Gaza disengagement plan.
The ICEJ in protest published a press release written by its executive director, Malcolm
Hedding. The statement read that the ICEJ is convinced that Israel is placing itself in
“grave and serious danger” through withdrawing from Gaza 195. The press release went
on to say that the Bible is clear that those nations who attempt to divide the land of Israel
will incur God’s disfavor. The ICEJ reasoned that these nations attempting to divide
Israel will “fall into the hands of the living God” 196. The press release ended with the
ICEJ focusing on the plight of the settlers being evacuated. It was emphasized that the
settlers had been encouraged to settle in Gaza by the government, only to later to have
their families uprooted by the same government 197.
On August 15, 2005 Israel began its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) were brought in to evacuate those settlers who refused
government orders to leave. By August 20, 2005 the IDF had evacuated all but four of
the Gaza settlements, and were operating weeks ahead of schedule. Ariel Sharon made
it clear at this time that he had no intention to evacuate any other settlements and would
wait for the Palestinians to end terror before returning to the Road Map 198.
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2006
On January 4, 2006 Ariel Sharon suffered a massive stroke at his ranch in the Negev
desert. Sharon suffered paralysis of the lower body and was placed in an induced
coma 199. Pat Robertson commenting on Sharon’s condition claimed in early February
that the stroke occurred because he attempted to divide God’s land. He went on to say
that when Bush proposed the Road Map in 2002, he warned the president to abandon it
based on appeals to his own faith 200.
By April 2006, it was reported that new Prime Minister Olmert would begin to
withdraw from more settlements in the West Bank as part of a larger disengagement
plan. When asked about these plans, John Hagee claimed that his organization would
continue supporting Israel 201. Other groups with the Christian Zionist Lobby were not as
supportive. Leaders of the Christian Right and neo-conservatives took out a full page
add in the Washington Times to denounce the plan by stating “friends don’t let friends
commit suicide” 202 The ad was signed by six evangelical groups.
Olmert continued to pursue what he called his convergence plan in the pursuit of
unilaterally dictating Israel’s borders. This continued until June 12, 2006 when Hezbollah
conducted a cross border raid, surprising the IDF and kidnapping two of their soldiers.
This caused Israel to undertake a massive invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of
punishing Hezbollah and recovering their missing soldiers 203. This action by Hezbollah
caused Olmert to come to the realization that even if Israel were to withdraw from the
occupied territories there would be no guarantee that the Jewish’s states security would
increase. Israel unilateralist policy officially came to an end on September 18, 2006.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Analysis
The evidence in this research allows for multiple interpretations of how much influence
Christian Zionist groups had on U.S. policy toward Israel. In analyzing the organizational
structures of the Christian Zionists, it was found that they actively lobbied the American
government to support their policy preferences. Yet many of these groups were
designated as “charities,” meaning they could not substantially lobby on behalf of their
preferences. Instead these organizations engaged in attempts to influence policy
through actions such as mass mobilization and media campaigns. These actions were
evident in the second case study, were the Christian Zionists used these tactics to
actively oppose the Road Map.
The actions stemmed from the maximalist positions held by the Christian
Zionists, who saw attempts at dividing god’s land as sacrilegious. These actions came in
the form of activities such as writing editorials, organizing conferences, and encouraging
letter writing campaigns. However, although evidence in these forms was found, there
were not strong causal linkages to show that the Christian Zionist lobbying caused the
U.S. to shift its policy in support of Israeli unilateralism. Moreover, the death of evidence
collected regarding Israeli unilateralism did not show whether the Christian Zionists
68

actually favored this policy to the Road Map. Due to this lack of evidence and weak
linkages between the evidence that was found I am unable to draw conclusions about
my hypothesis through the chosen theoretical perspective.
In order to better test this hypothesis in the future I would first conduct the
research with additional sources of evidence. One such way to gather more evidence
regarding the U.S. policy shift would be to interview politicians who support Christian
Zionist causes. A questionnaire could be given to them to find out how strongly they feel
the Christian Zionist Lobby impacts the decisions they make regarding Israel. It would
also be interesting to find out how strongly their own religious affiliations direct their
decisions on Israel, and whether their own religious convictions ever conflict with the
Christian Zionist groups that they associate with.
Another source of evidence would be to analyze archived statements and
newsletters from both the Christian Zionists organizations and the U.S. government.
Although some of the organizations did keep online archives of the statements they
released to the media, often the records only dated back as far as 2006. This was not
beneficial to this research since official statements were sought as far back as 2002.
Access to these public statements could show how the Christian Zionist organization’s
official statements and newsletters framed the issue for their supporters, and in what
ways they encouraged their supporters to take action to further their preferences. In
regards to data on the U.S. government, archived statements from the U.S. executive
branch could be acquired from the Department of State Office of the Historian. Likewise
archived statements from the legislative branch could be acquired from the
Congressional Record.
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Moreover, if in the future this study were to have funding, it would be beneficial to
pay opensecrets.org the $125 an hour fee to provide an individual listing of pro-Israeli
organizations by industry. This would allow for the broadening of Christian Zionist
organizations not mentioned by Mearsheimer and Walt to be researched. Finally, if the
funding were available, opensecrets.org could provide a more extensive listing of
politicians that the pro-Israel industry attempts to influence.
Any listing provided by opensecrets.org could also provide me with a more
complete listing of Christian Zionist groups. This would allow for me to eliminate some of
the current organizations I have listed as belonging to the Christian Zionist Lobby, while
possible adding others. These new organizations could then offer new sources of
evidence to test my hypothesis against. Therefore, by refining the organization under
study I could eliminate some groups suspected as not truly being part of the Christian
Zionist Lobby, but more closely resembling part of the Israel Lobby. For in using the
groups listed by Mearsheimer and Walt, it was found that some supposedly Christian
Zionist organizations were run by Jewish individuals. This is not to say that these Jewish
individuals would not lobby for Christian Zionists preferences, but instead to claim that it
would highly unlikely that they would lobby for these preferences due to their selfdefeating ends.
In addition to creating more sources of evidence, more cases could be added to
test the hypothesis. These case studies would involve the same question in this
research focusing on why the U.S. provides nearly unconditional support for Israel.
Three case studies that immediately come to mind involving the interests of the Christian
Zionists would be the Egypt-Israel Peace agreement, the Oslo Accords, and the IsraeliSyrian peace talks of 1999.
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For the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, Israel agreed to return the Sinai
Peninsula to Egypt in return for a full peace. In this case the U.S. allowed Israel to sign a
bilateral treaty with Egypt instead of pushing the Jewish state to sign a multilateral
comprehensive peace with the Arab states in the region. This case study would test how
the Christian Zionists lobbied for or against this policy for the purpose of providing Israel
with the most favorable outcome. I would expect to find evidence of the Christian
Zionists opposing this policy, and as a result, the American government not fully
engaging the peace process with Egypt and Israel. This reluctance of the Christian
Zionist to approve of this peace is attributed to the return of Sinai, which was promised
to the Jews in both Numbers and Ezekiel. While this would be an intriguing case study to
conduct, one problem would be that out of the Christian Zionist groups in this study, only
the NCLCI existed in 1979. Accordingly, for this case study to be conducted Christian
Zionist groups which existed in 1979 would have to be found and the range of actors in
the research expanded.
A case study involving the Oslo Accords would also be appealing to add to future
research. Although the Oslo Accords did not initially include any stipulations for a
Palestinian state, it did call for limited self-rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank by
Palestinians. Once again Christian Zionists would find fault with these agreements
because Jews would be losing control over the land promised to them by God. Thus,
due to Christian Zionist influence I would expect to find evidence showing the U.S.
showing more support to Israel during the Oslo Process. This case study would not have
the same difficulty of the aforementioned one, as all the Christian Zionist groups were
organized during this time frame except Stand for Israel and Christians United for Israel.
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Finally, the Syrian-Israeli peace talks of 1999 study would be attractive for the
same reason as the first two case studies. Mainly, the Christian Zionists would see the
Israeli government as going against God’s will by returning land promised to them. In
this case I would expect the U.S. to again provide Israel with support in dealing with the
Syrians or even ending the peace talks altogether. Again in this case all the Christian
Zionist groups could be included except for Stand for Israel and Christians United for
Israel.
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